teorema
Vol. XXXI/3, 2012, pp. 209-222
ISSN: 0210-1602
[BIBLID 0210-1602 (2012) 31:3; pp. 209-222]

The Social Value of Ritual and Music in Classical Chinese Thought

James Garrison

RESUMEN

Los filósofos occidentales han prestado atención al carácter social de la música, pero al hacerlo, el cuerpo ha permanecido en silencio. Esto demuestra la falta de conexión entre los ritmos de acción repetitiva y ritual y la interpretación musical. La filosofía de confucianismo clásico, aunque carece de un fuerte aparato crítico, contiene un vocabulario conceptual que une los ritos y la interpretación musical en la formación de la vida corporal y social. Los confucianos clásicos y los teóricos contemporáneos con influencias confucianas hacen bien en demostrar que la música no es simplemente un producto de la sociedad, si no que produce sociabilidad. Esto abre nuevas direcciones para la teoría crítica.

PALABRAS CLAVE: *ritmo, rito, música, socialización, confucianismo, Xún Zǐ, Theodor Adorno, Tia DeNora, Lǐ Zéhòu*.

ABSTRACT

Western philosophers have long paid attention to the social nature of music, but in doing so the body has been silent. This shows in the lack of a connection of rhythms of repetitive and ritualistic action to musical performance. Classical Confucian philosophy, though lacking a strong critical apparatus, contains a conceptual vocabulary linking rites and musical performance together in the formation of bodily social life. Classical Confucians and today's Confucian-influenced theorists do well in showing that music is not simply a product of society, and instead that it produces sociality. This opens up novel directions for critical theory.

KEYWORDS: *Rhythm, Rite, Music, Socialization, Confucianism, Xún Zǐ, Theodor Adorno, Tia DeNora, Lǐ Zéhòu*.

I

We all go through routines, some pleasant, and some unpleasant. We go to certain places at appointed hours, dancing to society's tune. We go into

those places in certain poses, with the body being normalized, regulated, and conducted just so. We go to those places and perform prescribed ritualized actions when called upon, as if on cue. And so society finds its rhythm.

Music, be it lyrical, instrumental, orchestral, and/or choreographed, models and intensifies social order. Perhaps more so than other varieties of art, music has social value. This is not to deny that the arts are generally capable of articulating political sentiments and visions for society. However, among the arts, only architecture, with its instilling of a sense of place, speaks more to the dynamic of self and society than music, with its modeling of harmonious change finding a rhythm over time.

Unfortunately though, the language and conceptual room to talk about the fusion of music, ritual, and performance in the development of self and society is somewhat lacking, at least in the mainstream Western idiom. True, we get there in fits and starts. There are ways of talking about music in regards to self and society. Nonetheless, the conversation is lacking, as music's role in the subject's bodily life is often overlooked or outright disregarded.

Luckily though, classical Confucianism offers a better-developed vocabulary and conceptual framework for dealing with music in terms of the habituation and ordering of the bodily self. Far from being mere intellectual or intercultural vanity, looking to Confucian philosophy for help with this topic is actually called for because, in its attention to music and social power, it works through issues with which Western philosophy has only recently started grappling. This classical Confucian framework enhances contemporary discussions in philosophy of music and social theory, helping them to converge in giving a body-oriented account of the constitutive role that music plays in the self/society dynamic.

II

Before getting into the specific view of ritual, music, and body-conscious social life that Confucianism offers, it is best to look first at the context of ancient China more broadly. The classical Chinese lexicon is key here, particularly as concerns harmony and rhythm. In both classical Chinese and contemporary Mandarin, their respective counterparts, *hé* 和 and *jié* 节, have noteworthy etymological connections.

Hé 和 signifies not just "harmony", but togetherness in a sense more general than music. Though originally having a culinary basis in the blending of flavors, this notion of harmony then came refer to sonic harmony [Ames & Rosemont (1998), pp. 56-57, cf. Lǐ (1971), p. 1221]. This idea of harmony became so thoroughgoing that it has come to stand for association itself, signifying the operator "and" in contemporary Mandarin, with the more specific

use of connecting two nouns (i.e. "Jones and Smith", "apples and oranges", but not "walking and chewing gum").

Classical Chinese thinkers stress that harmony differs from and exceeds sameness in a way that brings together disparate elements, be they different tones in music or different people in society [Jīn (2004), §13.23; Xú (2009), p. 187]. This sort of harmony is far from incidental, as seen in the syncretic philosophical compendium *Lü's Spring and Summer Annals*. Its passage "Great Music" contains a description of sound accompanying the emergence of bodily forms in the cosmos, bearing the type of harmony from which the first sage kings would fix principles for social flourishing [Zhāng *et al* (1987), p. 125]. As will be shown, this emphasis on harmony and diversity generally guides the later emerging Confucian understanding of music and social rites.

The character for rhythm *jié* 节 is similarly complex. Having originally signified a bamboo joint and division, it has a mereological connotation. From this sense of part and whole, a word family grew to include terms not just for musical rhythm and celebratory rites, but also for moral integrity, regulation, restraint, and control, all of which underlies this type of harmony's social and normative component. *Jié* and its associated terms thus point to an awareness embedded in the Chinese language of a deep structural relationship between music, rites, and social normativity.

Beyond the basic vocabulary of music, classical China had a number of canonical works on music that also prefigured more particular theoretical approaches to music and rite, especially within the Confucian canon. There is of course *The Book of Songs*, the compendium of lyric poetry that stands as one of the five classics upon which orthodox Confucians based their studies. The lyric poems themselves are the source of aphorisms and sentiments later taken up and expanded upon by Confucian scholars. They give the tradition a good deal of its direction, being used to sum up and justify Confucian arguments, somewhat akin to how Socrates uses myths of the underworld to drive his rational arguments home.

The connection between music and social order can be seen more directly in another of the five classics, *The Yìjīng* (popularly known as the *Book of Changes* or *I Ching*) and its description of how "ancient kings took up composing music to revere virtue, enrich the emperor, and to recall ancestors" [Zhōng (1999), 豫 §1]. Moreover, yet another of the five classics, *The Book of History*, also conveys the idea of music being tightly bound to social order. Here, the pertinent example is the court of Shùn 舜, later idealized by Confucius and his followers. Kuí 夔, the celebrated court musician for the mytho-historic leader Shùn, is credited with bringing order through his music, such that "when [he] strikes the stone, when [he] claps the stone, beasts dance and all of the officials assent harmoniously" [Chan, H. & Ho (2003), p. 76]. All of this is to say that, between terminology, ancient poetic verse, and the found-

ing social myths of China, a common thread persists — music and rite, rather than merely being products of society, also actually produce selves and society, setting up social life as such.

III

The Confucian school, growing from these roots, thus offers a wide-reaching framework for rites and music, and this has the benefit of exposing the relative paucity of work on this subject within Western philosophy. The most important notion here is ritual, or *lǐ* 礼. This idea of *lǐ* occupies a conceptual space missing in Western terminology. It serves as the point of connection between music, standing in for the arts by synecdoche, as well as the social formation of persons. Additionally, this Confucian notion of *lǐ* expresses a bodily sensibility often missing in Western approaches. This all cashes out in how *lǐ* serves as the pivot point between music, or *yuè* 乐, and the Confucian vision of bodily self and society. First though, more needs to be said about *lǐ* specifically.

Most importantly, *lǐ* are more than rituals. This is a convenient, if not coarse, translation, doing little to convey the role of *lǐ* both in the extraordinary and in the everyday. On the one hand, *lǐ* deals with ceremony writ large, particularly in the mode of ritual sacrifice, which indeed is indicated by the traditional form of the character (禮) depicting an altar (示) and a sacrificial vessel (豊). However, *lǐ* also include much more subtle forms of etiquette and comportment, in daily life. This includes the normal ways in which we show respect and/or deference, by using honorifics like "Professor" or "Officer". It extends also to the varying subtle and silent glances which we use everyday to recognize family, friends, acquaintances, co-workers, bosses, subordinates, etc. Hence, the term is often translated not just as ritual, but also as propriety.

Moreover, Confucian thinking turns on a link between the traditional terms for rites and the body — *lǐ* 禮 and *tǐ* 體. The phonemes are related, and the characters contain the same sacrificial vessel component on the right, *lǐ* (豊), while the left part of *tǐ* indicates bone or skeleton, *gǔ* 骨. Leading present-day Chinese philosopher Cheng Chung-ying holds that, rather than referring to something like a singular static physical corpus, *tǐ* "refer[s] to groups of people organized for special purposes, and even to concrete things in the world…[and] to anything that has a definite form and style of organization, such as types of writing styles" [Cheng (2002), p. 145].

This view, where self-cultivation through *lǐ* occurs with *tǐ* as the dynamic and qualitative process of organizing bodies, thus provides further conceptual background to the Confucian notion of musically centered rite.

With such rich connotations, it quickly becomes clear that the richness of *lǐ* vexes translation. Responding to this, renowned contemporary Confucian scholar Tu (Dù) Weiming 杜维明 catalogs the English-language renderings of *lǐ* and includes "'ceremony,' 'ritual,' 'rites,' 'propriety,' 'rules of propriety,' 'good custom,' 'decorum,' 'good form'". More to the point, Tu himself understands *lǐ* as "an authentic way of establishing human-relatedness" and as "the movement of self- transformation, the dialectical path through which man becomes more human" [Tu (1972), pp. 190, 194, 197]. Tu explains that the notion of *lǐ* "includes virtually all aspects of human culture: psychological, social, and religious", such that "in the Confucian context it is inconceivable that one can become truly human without going through the process of 'ritualization, which in this particular connection means humanization" [Tu (1972), p. 198].

Likewise, comparative philosophers Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont also call attention to the varied meanings and broad applicability of *lǐ*, describing this complex term as "a social grammar that provides each member with a defined place and status within the family, community, and polity" [Ames & Rosemont (1998), p. 51]. It is on this conceptual basis that Confucian texts mention *lǐ* as part of a conceptual dyad alongside *yuè*, or music, as giving one bearing. To this point, Confucius repeats a bit of wordplay in the dictum that *lǐ* give "knowledge of where to stand [*lì* 立]" [Jīn (2004), §8.8. 16.3, 20.3], and this captures how the idea of *lǐ* connotes *tǐ* as a process of organizing bodies in social space-time.

Accordingly, the concept of *lǐ* eludes capture by a one-word translation, since, per Confucius, it addresses how things large and small arise [Jīn (2004), §1.2]. Confucius again acknowledges the difficulty in general of speaking about *lǐ* (and music) where he asks, "in talking about *lǐ*, how could I just be talking about gifts of jade and silk? In referring to music how could I just be talking about bells and drums?" [Jīn (2004), §17.11]. Similarly, exaggerating *lǐ* and focusing on its grandiose elements by simply calling it ritual without qualification greatly misses the role of this social grammar in everyday contexts.

IV

The foregoing shows the broadness of *lǐ*, which can be difficult to comprehend. Fortunately, Xún Zǐ, perhaps the most extensive and exegetical thinker of the early Confucian tradition, offers a very useful framework for understanding *lǐ*. Riffing on the ambiguity in English, it could be said that, for Xún Zǐ, *lǐ* work to distinguish.

In the first sense, *lǐ* establish hierarchical and deferential relationships, where superiors are recognized as distinguished persons. For Xún Zǐ, *lǐ* "take common belongings for use, take the eminent and humble as prime for re-

finement, take disparity for distinction, take the lofty and the weak as necessary" [Wáng (1967), §19.16]. In his view, *lǐ* are part and parcel of how distinguished persons refine themselves, such that "*lǐ* trim what is long and extend what is short, do away with excess, add to the deficient, reaching to the refinement of love and respect, so that the beauty of conduct flourishes" [Wáng (1967), §19.20].

Secondly, *lǐ* also distinguish between things, because ritualized propriety exaggerates and clarifies the different roles that all people play, thereby aiding appreciation of distinctions within language and social life. Being nurtured by ritual helps in becoming "fond of distinctions", so that "the eminent and the humble have rank, young and old are treated differently, the poor and rich each have different degrees of importance" with "distinctions between the noble who serve the noble and the vulgar who serve the base, the grandeur of the great, and the pettiness of the small" [Wáng (1967), §19.3, §19.7]. In this sense, *lǐ* establish the terms of polite society by separating and focusing constituent parts of the social scene. Though not specifically dealing with Xún Zǐ and how *lǐ* distinguish, David Hall and Roger Ames describe, how in this regard Confucian thought anticipates major themes in Jacques Derrida's neologism *différance*, the process of deferring and differing [Hall and Ames (1987), pp. 292-293; cf. Derrida (1972), pp. 8-9]. When thought along these lines, understanding the many senses of *lǐ*, grand and subtle, comes down to a common process—the continual and stratified co-emergence of the singular and plural, of self and society.

V

The centrality of *lǐ* within Confucian social thinking also makes music, or *yuè* 乐, a major topic, because musical performance focuses and distills the more disperse occurrence of social rites. Accordingly, Confucian thought treats *lǐ* and *yuè* as a conceptual pair. While *lǐ* provide orientation in ordinary contexts, participation in music/dance performance emphasizes and amplifies ritual gestures, providing a novel context for learning where to stand. Furthermore, music elevates ritual, bringing aesthetic pleasure and emotional enjoyment to *lǐ*. Confucius puts these terms together, playing with the identical Chinese characters used to render joy (*lè* 乐) and music (*yuè* 乐), in the idea that joy accompanies ritual and music [Jīn (2004), §16.5].

Xún Zǐ voices a similar sentiment at the beginning of his discussion of music, where he is less coy with his wordplay in directly stating "music is joy, being inevitable in human feeling" [Wáng (1967), §20.1]. The following passages then form the basis for his argument that music plays a necessary role in social life, on the basis of its connection to *lǐ* and his theory of human

emotions. This was necessary for Xún Zǐ, because a general opposition to music was a major platform of the competing Mohist school. Its leader, Mò Zǐ 墨子, believed music, despite its pleasure, to be ultimately superfluous to statecraft diverting valuable materiel and energy [Yán (1995), 非乐上 §1-3, 5]. Moreover, Mò Zǐ held that music's common appeal distracts people from their proper and particular domains, taking the politician away from governance, and the farmer from cultivation [Yán (1995), 非乐上 §4, 6]. Therefore, for Mohists, music is to be condemned.

Xún Zǐ targets the Mohists because of their failure to realize that, though ritual might divert from other and supposedly more necessary ventures, the regulative value of ritual for those other ventures is of profound value. In Confucianism, there is a very real sense in which personal and social investment in music and social rites helps to secure social roles. It may not be something that pays off financially, but for Confucians, the wider social economy flourishes to the extent that "the sovereign reigns, ministers minister, fathers father, and sons 'son'" [Jīn (2004), §12.11]. For Confucians like Xún Zǐ, this valuable knowledge of where to stand in social roles depends on rites and music, which therefore means that they cannot be superfluous, contra Mò Zǐ.

And so, Xún Zǐ goes to great lengths to claim that not only is music a worthwhile pursuit, but that it is integral both to statecraft and self-cultivation, with a social value rooted in the nature of emotion. Here, Xún Zǐ presents what could be called a "hydraulic" view of human emotionality, meaning that there must be suitable outlets for expression, lest pressure build.

Note that this is somewhat different from how music's social power might be seen now, that is as being able to articulate social critique, protest, and/or general dissatisfaction. The conservatism of Xún Zǐ and classical Confucianism would preclude music that might breed anarchy. And it is precisely the specter of social chaos that necessitates room for at least some expression of emotion, even in this strict view. Xún Zǐ makes this clear where he declares, "people have affectionate and hateful feelings, but without joyful or angry ways of responding, there will be disorder" [Wáng (1967), §20.6]. So contrarily, when a regime attuned to the people makes available appropriate musical outlets for emotion, joy is possible. This shows that, for Xún Zǐ, the equivalence between music and joy is not a given, but rather something to be achieved.

As regards the founding of personhood through musical/ritual self-cultivation though, Xún Zǐ goes into greater detail, giving real content to this notion of joy in music, declaring that:

> Performing music clarifies the will; cultivating ritual perfects conduct. The ear and eye become acute, blood and bodily energy harmonize and balance, move-

> ments and customs transform and change, everything under heaven becomes tranquil, and everyone together enjoys what is beautiful and good. Thus it said: music is joy. [Wáng (1967), §20.7]

This passage points to another related characteristic of music, namely its ability to bring people together. In this regard, music affects the physical constitution of individual bodies, and thus the quality of how those bodies are spatially and temporally ordered in the social scene. This can be seen where Xún Zǐ describes how courtly music brings together the high and low and sets up deferential relationships between fathers and sons, older and younger brothers, etc. [Wáng (1967), §20.2].

This shows that the Confucian notion of ritual/musical self-cultivation is tightly connected to social stability, particularly as Xún Zǐ describes it. This may be in tension with a commonplace notion in contemporary thought borne out by musicians as diverse as Arnold Schoenberg, Miles Davis, and Jimi Hendrix amongst others, namely that of music having the capability to engender radical critique of fixed social structures.

Likewise, there are internal critiques from with the Confucian tradition against Xún Zǐ and his approach to ritual/musical self-cultivation. The point of contention here is his particular way of taking the background of earlier Chinese thought on *hé*, cosmic harmony, as being related to music and ritual flourishing on Earth. Xún Zǐ argues that that cultivating *dào* 道, which would include self-cultivation through ritual and music, means realizing the difference between humanity and the heavens [Wáng (1967), §13.1]. For him, the establishment of ritual propriety comes from mytho-historical sages like Yú 余, who, despite being granted no special favor by the heavens, set forth the rites and established society in a grand work attributable to external forces, thereby uniting inborn nature with artifice and doing the same for the heavens and the earth as well [Wáng (1967), §23.17-18].

On the face of it this might seem to be cause for worry, as here Xún Zǐ violates the major tenant of classical Chinese and Confucian thought that the heavens and the earth are one, both in the last citation and his controversial statement that consummate personhood means realizing the differences between the heavens and the earth [Wáng (1967), §17.1]. This has the effect of making the court musician as well as the sovereign conducting society's rhythm into heralds for something like a transcendental *dào*. This is not unlike the notion commonplace in Western thought, that genius speaks to the artist from without, from beyond. In Confucian terms, this unorthodox approach is troublesome because it indicates the sort of oppositional dualism which the Western tradition has been trying get past for centuries and which Chinese philosophers usually are keen on avoiding.

Despite this, Xún Zǐ is key for the notion of rites and music articulating cosmic harmony taking hold in the ensuing scholarly Confucian tradition.

This is what Erica Brindley has in mind where, in her exhaustive account "Music, Cosmos, and the Development of Psychology in Early China", she writes, "Xunzi's idealizations of music foreshadow what becomes normative in many later writings: a belief in the power of music to complete and fulfill cosmic operations" [Brindley, p. 39].

Putting aside the particularities of how Xún Zǐ stands in relation to the wider Confucian tradition, it is nonetheless clear how *lǐ* and music are united and how that unity is central to the Confucian worldview. Put simply, whereas *lǐ* distinguish and separate, musical performance harmonizes and unites. Xún Zǐ expands on this, stating definitively that "music has harmonies which cannot be changed; ritual has principles which cannot be changed. Music unites; ritual differentiates. The unity of ritual and music conducts the human heart/mind. Music's emotionality deals with change at its most basic level" [Wáng (1967), §20.8]. This all fits with the later definitive statement in *The Book of Han* historical chronicle which records Confucius saying that "to fix the governance of the people there is nothing more proper than ritual and to move custom there is nothing more proper than music", and his conclusion that "The two go together with each other" [Bān (2004), p. 776].

VI

Recall the notion of harmony, *hé*, mentioned earlier and the stress on it not being mere sameness, but rather the melding of different particulars. Ritual and music, *lǐ* and *yuè* affect this type of social harmony. *Lǐ* distinguish, while *yuè* unites. *Lǐ* stratify, setting up hierarchical social power. Musical performance intensifies ritual propriety while also bringing a common aesthetic element and emotional sensibility into the mix. In the Confucian vision *lǐ* and *yuè*, rites and music, act together both to cultivate individuals and to foster social harmony.

However, observers of China's present or past may be wary of the term "social harmony", and with good reason. The Mainland Chinese government uses the idea of social harmony, with all of its Confucian resonances, as a rationale for its authoritarian acts. This most definitely includes control of music, both through widespread censorship and the heavy-handed promotion of propagandistic "red songs" in the state media apparatus led by former Communist Party up-and-comer Bó Xīlái 薄熙来 before his fall from grace in 2012. This view of music, rite, and social harmony was also tied up with the historical conservatism of imperial authorities, indeed to the point of being stifling.

With these types of thoughts in mind, Tu makes it very clear in his description of *lǐ* that he sees genuine problem occurring when this view of rite (and by extension, music) goes unchecked. For him, absent an internal sense of moral right to go with the external sense of performative rite, "*li* becomes

empty formalism…degenerat[ing] into social coercion incapable of conscious improvement and liable to destroy any true human feelings" [Tu (1968), p. 37].

That a certain coercive notion of rite and music has sometimes found a place in Confucian-influenced societies in no way negates the value of the insights into the way that *lǐ* and *yuè* are key to the development of self and society. The notion of rite and music described in the Confucian texts can be part of critical frameworks attempting to conceptualize how power enforces and propagates particular visions of "social harmony." Though classical Confucianism, with its various anachronisms, is sometimes difficult to square with the modern era, its insights are of value to all.

VII

This is not to say that the Western tradition is completely bereft of approaches to music and social formation, but rather that its shortcomings here can be aided by the classical Confucian approach. Consider Plato, the figure looming over European antiquity, and his well-known advocacy in both *The Republic* and *Laws* of philosophical guardians restricting and preserving the training and performance of music, poetic verse, and bodily gymnastics as a matter of civic policy [Plato (1997), 424b-d; 812e-813a; 816c-d; 829c-e]. As suits Platonic thought, the pursuit of beauty in musical self-cultivation would only take place after moral education in these ideal utopias, since this brand of music would exist for the sake of a harmony within the soul, only involving the body incidentally [Plato (1997), 402c; 411e]. So not only does Plato's approach to music and social subject formation occupy itself with a dubious oppositional mind/body dualism, it does not even deign to treat musical cultivation as a possible bridge for ameliorating that dichotomy. This leaves the impression that, were they able to dispense with physical matter, Plato's guardians might well banish all instruments too, leaving behind only the disembodied music of the heavenly spheres and expressing the Pythagorean scale, as "rationally" derived in *Timeaus* [Plato (1997), 35a-36d].

True, there is a connection between Confucianism and Platonism on the topic of music's socializing role, especially in the support for conservative censorship in musical training and performance. However, there is a characteristic regard for the body in classical Confucian programs for self-cultivation not present in Platonism. Insofar as these schools set the tone for subsequent discussion of music and the social subject within their respective spheres, this distinction is important because it signals how Confucianism, as a living and changing tradition reaching past its classical period, might contribute to current discussions, especially in light of the relatively recent rehabilitation of the body as a notion within Euro-American philosophy.

In more recent times, Theodor Adorno has supplied the most compelling philosophical account of music's role in the formation of the social self, but even his work here may benefit from a Confucian perspective. This assertion might appear odd at first, given the obvious anachronism. Adorno's own remarks would seem to deny the possibility of Confucian music, musical self-cultivation regimens, and/or theories of music having much present value.

The Marxist orientation of Adorno's thought leads him to look askance at social control through music in a way that indirectly implicates Confucianism. He fears "a world downfall" occurring with music working to stabilize and instill conformity and bringing with it "the danger of 'dangerlessness'" [Adorno (1991), pp. 136-137]. In the secularized contemporary market, much like in the ancient polis, rhythm becomes the drumbeat of discipline pounding out the workday; harmony becomes insipid, and in unthinking repetition such harmony promotes hegemonic homogeneity [Adorno (1991), p. 67]. Adorno thus sees danger for social development in Plato's quasi-fascist musical conservatism, which promotes superficiality and cults of personality [Adorno (1991), p. 11]. And so, much of what Adorno derides about music in the utopian political states of Plato's imagination and in the real-world examples from Europe's history applies to classical Confucian culture. The idea of music being able to manifest a type of angst and unease with conformity is very important to him [Adorno (1991), pp. 44-45]. Unfortunately, Adorno's idea of this type of radical music developing novel social possibilities would be similarly anathema to both Plato and Confucius, neither of whom would abide the tonal and rhythmic experiments in twelve-tone composition of Adorno's exemplar, Arnold Schoenberg.

What then might Confucian thought bring to the table, especially in light of Adorno's definitive work? The more recent Adorno-influenced writings of Tia DeNora highlight some worrisome aspects of his thoughts; and while she herself does not invoke Confucianism, its perspective can aid her work here. While DeNora's works clearly appropriate Adorno's way of thinking about music, she is forthright when it comes to his weaknesses. She endorses neither Adorno's idiosyncratic and rigidly dismissive value judgments of valid and invalid musical enterprises (like jazz), nor his seeming restriction of musical enjoyment to the cognitive [DeNora (2003), pp. 32-33]. In this regard, though Plato and Adorno stand at historical poles within the Western tradition and advance quite different visions for music's social role, they nonetheless evince a common repudiation of the role of the body. For her own part, DeNora is after a new approach that takes music to be constitutive of social, bodily life instead of just its reflection or a means of control, as Adorno might have it [DeNora (2003), pp. 57, 134; DeNora (2004), pp. 84, 99].

Despite the anachronism, the exponents of Confucianism, both classical and contemporary, emphasize precisely this constitutive role of music in social, bodily life and this can be of real value to projects like DeNora's. For

most of the Euro-American audience, the classical Chinese works by themselves can provide a novel context for re-evaluating ossified assumptions about music and the ongoing formation of the relational self.

However, it is also worth noting that, like Adorno and those of his ilk, recent Chinese thinkers also have had a great deal of experience with Marxist thought, which has resulted in a trend of critically engaging and reformulating the Confucian worldview and retaining features like its notion of body-oriented self-cultivation. Perhaps the most important figure here, especially for English-speaking audiences, is Lǐ Zéhòu 李泽厚, whose work draws on several sources including Kantian aesthetics, Marxian materialism, and classical Chinese social thought. With his extensive critical apparatus Lǐ appropriates a lot of the general Confucian vocabulary in his Marxian approach to what he calls the humanization of nature, where all human endeavors, all human artifice, including music in the sense of ritual *lǐ*, play a deeply constitutive and historically-sedimented role in human life, singular and plural [Li Z. & Cauvel, J. (2006), p. 66]. This Marxian-Confucian view shows in his formulation that aesthetic experience first emerges "as the laboring skill harmonizes with the rhythms of nature" [Li Z. & Cauvel, J. (2006), p. 178]. With this in mind, Lǐ surveys the Chinese and Western traditions and finds that:

> Chinese sages transformed and rationalized the power of the shamans into rites and rituals and interpreted these powers as manifested in music and poetry to be constructive. Western scholars considered the powers of the muses attractive and powerful, but whimsical, and a threat to humans' most treasured faculty: reason [Li Z. & Cauvel, J. (2006), p. 26]

This gives a small indication of how, on the basis of the Confucian background described here, more recent Chinese philosophy is also well positioned to address the issues occupying Adorno and more recent ethnomusicologists. It can do so in a way that speaks to the trend in critical theory, seen in the works of Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, and Richard Shusterman, which has seen a weakening of the idea of a rational and atomic self and a shift toward a more profoundly bodily and relational model.

Concluding Remarks

We *need* a way of speaking about rites, repetition, and disciplines as part of a continuum alongside musical performance. Even though classical Confucianism accepts the terms of power far too readily for today's more critical projects, such endeavors still nonetheless stand to benefit from listening for consonances in how less-familiar traditions explain social power in terms of rite and music. Though it is in a different voice, the Confucian framework of *lǐ* and *yuè* can nonetheless help contemporary philosophers

from around the world in articulating a more comprehensive framework for the social nature of music, particularly as concerns the possibility of body-oriented self-cultivation through rite and music.

Department of Philosophy
University of Vienna
Universitätsstraße 7
A-1010 Vienna, Austria
E-mail: james.garrison@univie.ac.at

REFERENCES

ADORNO, T. W (1991), *Dissonanzen: Musik in der Verwaltenen Welt*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

AMES, R. & ROSEMONT, H. (1998), *The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation*, New York, Ballantine.

BĀN G. 班固 (2004), *漢書* [*History of the Han*], Shanghai, 漢語大詞典出版社 [Shanghai Dictionary Press].

BRINDLEY, E. (2006), 'Music, Cosmos, and the Development of Psychology in Early China', *T'oung Pao*, Vol. 92, Nos. 1-3, pp. 1-49.

CHAN, H. & HO, C. (2003), *Citations from the* Shangshu *to Be Found in Pre-Han and Han Texts*, Hong Kong, Chinese University Press.

DENORA, T. (2003), *After Adorno: Rethinking Music Sociology*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

— (2004), *Music in Everyday Life*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

CHENG, C.Y. (2002), 'On the Metaphysical Significance of *Ti* (Body-Embodiment) of Chinese Philosophy: *Benti* (Origin-Substance) and *Ti-Yong* (Substance and Function)', *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 145-161.

DERRIDA, J. (1975), *Marges de la Philosophie*, Paris, Les Éditions de Minuit.

HALL, D. & AMES, R. (1987), *Thinking Through Confucius*, Albany, State University of New York.

JĪN, L. N. 金良年 (2004), *论语译注* [*The Annotated Analects*], Shanghai, 上海古籍出版社 [Shanghai Ancient Books Press].

LI, Z. H. & CAUVEL, J. (2006), *Four Essays on Aesthetics: Toward a Global View*, Lexington Books, Lanham MD.

LI, Z. D. 李宗侗 (1971), *春秋左傳今註今譯* [*The Zuo Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals: Modern Annotation, Modern Language*]. Taipei, 臺灣商務印書館 [Taiwan Commercial Press].

PLATO (1997), *Plato: Complete Works*. Indianapolis, Hackett.

TU, W. M. (1968), 'The Creative Tension between *Jên* and *Li*', *Philosophy East and West*, vol. XVIII, pp. 29-39.

— (1972), '*Li* as a Process of Humanization', *Philosophy East and West*, vol. XXII, pp. 187-201.

WÁNG, Y. W. 王雲五 (1967), *四部叢刊初編* [*Four Division Series: First Edition*], Taipei, 臺灣商務印書館 [Taiwan Commercial Press].

ZHŪ, X. 朱熹 (2006), *詩集傳* [*Poetry Collection*], Taipei 藝文印書館 [Yee Wen Publishing Company].

YÁN, L. F. 嚴靈峯 (1995), *墨子簡編* [*Mòzi Compendium*], Taipei, 臺灣商務印書館 [Taiwan Commercial Press].

XÚ, Z. S. 徐中舒 (2009), *左传选* [*Selections from the Zuo Commentary*], Beijing, 中华书局 [Zhong Hua Book Company].

ZHĀNG, S. D. 张双棣, ZHĀNG, W.B. 张万彬, YĪN, G.G. 殷国光, CHÉN, T. 陈涛 (1987), *吕氏春秋译注上* [*Annotation of the Spring and Autumn Annals*], Changchun, China, 吉林文史出版社 [Jilin Literature and History Press].

ZHŌNG, T. D. 鍾泰德 (1999), *易經通釋* [*Interpretation of the Yì Jīng*], Taipei, 正中書局 [Cheng Chung Book Company].